

# **EXHIBIT 227**

## **PART 1 OF 2**

~~SECRET~~ MATERIALS ATTACHED

To: Philip  
Chris  
Dan

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE  
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,  
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-048, document no. 17  
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: July 8, 2015

From: Dana  
Mike

Date: June 6, 2003

Subject: Updated work plans and detailed list of associates

Attached are our revised work plans and a detailed list of associates mentioned in the workplans for the Commissioners and the FBI.

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**Workplan: Issues Relating to The FBI Informant with Whom 9/11  
Hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar Resided**

Dana Lesemann

Michael Jacobson

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~~SECRET~~ and COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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**The FBI Informant with Whom 9/11 Hijackers  
Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar Resided**

**Item 1: Key Questions**

**A. Informant's Credibility**

1. Was the FBI informant who lived with hijackers Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar aware of the hijackers' terrorist affiliations, plans, and intentions prior to the September 11 attacks?
2. Has the FBI completed its investigation of issues relating to the informant's credibility? If so, what were the results of this investigation and was it sufficiently thorough and impartial?
3. Can the Commission provide immunity in exchange for the informant's testimony? If so, should the Commission seek approval to provide the informant with immunity in exchange for the informant's testimony?

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**Item 2: Suggested Readings**

1. Transcript of October 9-10, 2002, Closed Joint Inquiry Hearing;
2. Final Report of the Joint Inquiry, pp. 165-176;
3. Michael Isikoff, "The Informant Who Lived with the Hijackers," Newsweek, September 16, 2002 (attached);
4. James Risen, "Threats and Responses: The Inquiry; Congress Seeks FBI Data on Informer; FBI Resists," October 5, 2002 (attached);
5. Susan Schmidt, "9/11 Panel Discusses Informant," Washington Post, October 11, 2002 (attached);
6. CBS Morning News: "Confrontation between Congress and the FBI Over Key Information about 9/11" (transcript), October 11, 2002 (attached).

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**Item 3: Interview Candidates**

1. The informant;
2. Former Special Agent Steven Butler, FBI San Diego Field Office;
3. San Diego FBI agents who conducted the post-9/11 criminal investigation of the informant;
4. Current and former Special Agent(s) in Charge, FBI San Diego Field Office;
5. Current and former Assistant Special Agent(s) in Charge for International Terrorism, FBI San Diego Field Office.

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**Item 4: Document Requests**

1. All FD-302's (reports of interview), investigative inserts, electronic communications, Letterhead Memoranda, and other documents since September 11, 2001, concerning the informant.

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**A Brief Overview of Possible Saudi Government Connections  
to the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks<sup>1</sup>**

**I. Southern California Connections**

1. **Omar Al-Bayoumi:** Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi national, provided September 11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar with considerable assistance after the hijackers arrived in San Diego in February 2000. He helped them locate an apartment, co-signed their lease, and ordered Mohdhar Abdullah (discussed below) to provide them with whatever assistance they needed in acclimating to the United States. The FBI now believes that in January 2000 al-Bayoumi met with Fahad al-Thumairy, a Saudi diplomat and cleric, at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles before going to the restaurant where he met the hijackers and engaged them in conversation. Whether or not al-Bayoumi's meeting with the hijackers was accidental or arranged is still the subject of debate. During his conversation with the hijackers, Al-Bayoumi invited them to move to San Diego, which they did shortly thereafter. Al-Bayoumi has extensive ties to the Saudi Government and many in the local Muslim community in San Diego believed that he was a Saudi intelligence officer. The FBI believes it is possible that he was an agent of the Saudi Government and that he may have been reporting on the local community to Saudi Government officials. In addition, during its investigation, the FBI discovered that al-Bayoumi has ties to terrorist elements as well. (S)
2. **Osama Bassnan:** Bassnan was a very close associate of al-Bayoumi's, and was in frequent contact with him while the hijackers were in San Diego. Bassnan, a vocal supporter of Usama Bin Ladin, admitted to an FBI asset that he met al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar while the hijackers were in San Diego, but denied this in a later conversation. There is some circumstantial evidence that he may have had closer ties to the hijackers, but the FBI has been unable to corroborate this additional reporting. Bassnan received considerable funding from Prince Bandar and Princess Haifa, supposedly for his wife's medical treatments. According to FBI documents, Bassnan is a former employee of the Saudi Government's Educational Mission in Washington, D.C. (S)
3. **Fahad Al-Thumairy:** Until recently al-Thumairy was an accredited Saudi diplomat and imam at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California. The news media reported that the U.S. Government revoked al-Thumairy's visa in May 2003; the diplomat subsequently returned to Saudi Arabia. The FBI now believes that Omar al-Bayoumi met with al-Thumairy at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles before al-Bayoumi went to the restaurant where he met the hijackers. According to witness reporting, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were also taken to the King Fahad Mosque while they were in the United States. (S)

<sup>1</sup> This list is a summary of the most important individuals with whom the hijackers may have had contact. There are others about whom we currently have less information but who may be of interest later in our inquiry.

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4. **Mohdhar Abdullah:** Abdullah was tasked by Omar al-Bayoumi to provide al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar with whatever assistance they needed while in San Diego. Abdullah, who became one of the hijackers' closest associates in San Diego, translated for them, helped them open bank accounts, contacted flight schools for the hijackers, and helped them otherwise acclimate to life in the United States. ~~(S)~~
5. **Osama Nooh and Lafi al-Harbi:** Al-Harbi and Nooh are Saudi naval officers who were posted to San Diego while hijackers al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were living there. After the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, the FBI determined that al-Hazmi had telephonic contact with both Nooh and al-Harbi while al-Hazmi was in the United States. ~~(S)~~

## II. Other Possible Saudi Government Contacts

1. **Mohammed Quadir-Harunani:** Quadir-Harunani has been the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation since 1999 and the FBI is currently investigating whether he had contact with the September 11<sup>th</sup> hijackers. In June 2000 a call was placed from Transcom International, a company owned by Quadir-Harunani, to a number subscribed to by Said Bahaji, one of the key members of the Hamburg cell. Quadir-Harunani is also a close associate of Usama bin Ladin's half-brother, Abdullah Bin Ladin (discussed below), who was assigned to the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. ~~(S)~~
2. **Abdullah Bin Ladin:** Abdullah bin Ladin (ABL) is reportedly Usama bin Ladin's half-brother. He is the President and Director of the World Arab Muslim Youth Association (WAMY) and the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies in America. Both organizations are local branches of non-governmental organizations based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. According to the FBI, there is reason to believe that WAMY is "closely associated with the funding and financing of international terrorist activities and in the past has provided logistical support to individuals wishing to fight in the Afghan War." ABL has been assigned to the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. as an administrative officer. He is a close associate of Mohammed Quadir-Harunani's and has provided funding for Transcom International. ~~(S)~~
3. **Fahad Abdullah Saleh Bakala:** According to an FBI document, Bakala was close friends with two of the September 11<sup>th</sup> hijackers. The document also notes that Bakala has worked as a pilot for the Saudi Royal Family, flying Usama Bin Ladin between Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia during UBL's exile. ~~(S)~~
4. **Hamad Alotaibi:** Alotaibi was assigned to the Saudi Embassy Military Division in Washington, D.C. According to an eyewitness report, one of the September 11<sup>th</sup> hijackers may have visited Alotaibi at his residence; another

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FBI document notes that a second hijacker may have also visited this address.

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5. **Hamid Al-Rashid:** Al-Rashid is an employee of the Saudi Civil Aviation Authority and was apparently responsible for approving the salary of Omar al-Bayoumi. Hamid al-Rashid is also the father of Saud al-Rashid, whose photo was found in a raid of an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Karachi and who has admitted to being in Afghanistan between May 2000 and May 2001. ~~(S)~~
6. **Homaidan Al-Turki:** Al-Turki is a Saudi student living in Colorado. According to FBI documents, he has ties to the Saudi Royal Family and the Saudi Government is funding his education. Al-Turki was in contact with an individual in Germany in 2001 who was also in contact with one of the hijackers prior to the attacks. ~~(S)~~
7. **Ghassan Al-Sharbi:** Al-Sharbi is a Saudi student who was taking flight lessons in the Phoenix area before the September 11 attacks and is mentioned in the "Phoenix EC." The U.S. Government captured al-Sharbi in the same location where Abu Zubaida was discovered in early 2002. After Al-Sharbi was captured, the FBI discovered that he had buried a cache of documents nearby, including an envelope from the Saudi Embassy in Washington that contained al-Sharbi's flight certificate. ~~(S)~~
8. **Saleh Al-Hussayen:** According to FBI documents, Saleh Al-Hussayen is a Saudi Interior Ministry employee/official and may also be a prominent Saudi cleric. According to one news article, Saleh Al-Hussayen is the Chief Administrator of the Holy Mosques in Mecca and Medina. An FBI affidavit notes that Saleh Al-Hussayen stayed in the same hotel as three of the hijackers on September 10, 2001. He told the FBI that he did not know the hijackers. The FBI agents interviewing him, however, believed he was being deceptive. The interview was terminated when al-Hussayen either passed out or feigned a seizure and was taken to the hospital; he then departed the country before the FBI could reinterview him. Saleh Al-Hussayen is also the uncle of Sami Al-Hussayen (discussed below). ~~(S)~~
9. **Sami Al-Hussayen:** In February 2003 Sami Al-Hussayen was arrested and charged with visa fraud. According to the indictment, al-Hussayen routed thousands of dollars he received from overseas sources to the Islamic Assembly of North America, an organization also under investigation for ties to terrorism. Al-Hussayen also allegedly set up web sites that promoted suicide bombing and using airplanes as weapons four months before the September 11 attacks. ~~(S)~~
10. **Mohammed Fakihi:** Fakihi is a Saudi diplomat. Until recently he was assigned to the Islamic Affairs Section of the Saudi Embassy in Berlin, Germany. Soon after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, German authorities searched

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the apartment of Munir Motassadeq, an associate of the hijackers in Hamburg, and found Fakihi's business card. According to press reports, the Saudis did not respond to German requests for information on Fakihi. More recently, German authorities discovered that Fakihi had contacts with other terrorists; Fakihi was subsequently recalled to Saudi Arabia. (S)

11. **Salah Bedaiwi:** Bedaiwi is a Saudi Naval officer who was posted to a U.S. Navy base in Pensacola, Florida. He visited the Middle Eastern Market in Miami, a location frequented by several of the hijackers, and was in contact with at least one of the hijackers' possible associates. The FBI has been investigating these connections, as well as his ties to other terrorist elements. (S)
12. **Mohammed Al-Qudhaeein and Hamdan Al-Shalawi:** Al-Qudhaeein and Al-Shalawi were both Saudi students living in the Phoenix area. Qudhaeein was receiving funding from the Saudi Government during his time in Phoenix. Qudhaeein and Al-Shalawi were involved in a 1999 incident aboard an America West flight that the FBI's Phoenix Office now believes may have been a "dry run" for the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. Al-Qudhaeein and Al-Shalawi were traveling to Washington, D.C. to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy; the Saudi Embassy paid for their airfare. According to FBI documents, during the flight they engaged in suspicious behavior, including several attempts to gain access to the cockpit. The plane made an emergency landing in Ohio, but no charges were filed against either individual. The FBI subsequently received information in November 2000 that Al-Shalawi had been trained at the terrorist camps in Afghanistan to conduct Khobar Tower-type attacks and the FBI has also developed information tying Al-Qudhaeein to terrorist elements as well. (S)
13. **Ali Hafiz Al-Marri and Maha Al-Marri:** Ali Al-Marri was indicted for lying to the FBI about his contact with Mustafa Al-Hasawi, one of the September 11<sup>th</sup> financiers. Ali Al-Marri, who arrived in the United States shortly before the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, attempted to call Al-Hasawi a number of times from the United States. The FBI has recently received reporting that he may also have been an al-Qa'ida "sleeper agent." According to FBI documents, Ali Al-Marri has connections to the Saudi Royal Family. The Saudi Government provided financial support to his wife, Maha Al-Marri, after Ali Al-Marri was detained and assisted her in departing the United States before the FBI could interview her. (S)

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**The FBI Informant with Whom 9/11 Hijackers  
Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar Resided**

**FBI informant codenamed “Muppet.”** Two September 11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, resided in San Diego with an FBI informant codenamed “Muppet.” A third hijacker may also have visited Muppet’s residence. The FBI agent handling “Muppet” prior to the attacks was aware that Muppet had two Saudi roommates named “Nawaf” and “Khalid,” but did not know their complete identities until after the attacks. The FBI has investigated Muppet and has concluded that he did not have advance knowledge of the attacks. The FBI acknowledges that some questions remain with regard to Muppet’s credibility, but does not believe that the remaining issues reflect on the central issue of whether he was aware of the hijackers’ plans or intentions. The Joint Inquiry was not able to interview or depose Muppet to address these issues. ~~(S)~~

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**Workplan: Possible Saudi Government and Royal Family  
Connections to the September 11 Hijackers and Other Terrorists and  
Terrorist Groups**

Dana Lesemann

Michael Jacobson

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**Possible Saudi Government and Royal Family Connections to the September 11 Hijackers and Other Terrorists and Terrorist Groups**

**Item 1: Key Questions**

**A. Possible Saudi Government and/or Royal Family Involvement in the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks**

1. Did any individuals, companies, religious institutions, or charitable organizations connected to the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family provide logistical, operational, financial, or theological support for the September 11, 2001, attacks?
2. Were any individuals connected to the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family aware of the September 11<sup>th</sup> plot prior to the attacks?

**B. Aggressiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Investigate Possible Ties Between the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family, and the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks**

1. How aggressively has the U.S. Government investigated possible ties between the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family, and the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks?
2. To what extent have the U.S. Government's efforts to investigate possible ties between the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family, and the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks been affected by political, economic, or other considerations?

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**Item 2: Suggested Readings**

1. Final Report of the Joint Inquiry, pp. 415-443.
2. Transcript of the October 9-10, 2002, closed Joint Inquiry Hearing.
3. Robert Baer, "The Fall of the House of Saud," Atlantic Monthly, May 2003 (attached).
4. F. Gregory Gause, III "Saudi Perceptions of the United States since 9-11," prepared for the conference on "Western and Non-Western Perceptions of America in the Aftermath of 9-11," September 30-October 1, 2002 (draft) (attached).
5. Michael Isikoff, "9-11 Hijackers: A Saudi Money Trail?" Newsweek, November 22, 2002 (attached).
6. David Johnston and James Risen, "Threats and Responses: Tracking Terrorism: 9-11 report Says Saudi Arabia Links Went Unexamined," New York Times, November 23, 2002 (attached).
7. Lisa Myers, "Saudi Envoy, Sept. 11 figures linked," MSNBC, May 14, 2003 (attached).
8. Eric Rouleau, "Trouble in the Kingdom," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002 (attached).

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**Item 3: Interview Candidates****A. Possible Saudi Government and/or Royal Family Involvement in the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks**

1. Primary FBI, CIA and NSC personnel involved in investigations of the following individuals:

Individuals of interest:

- a. Salah Bedaiwi
- b. Fahad Al-Thumairy
- c. Abdullah Bin Ladin
- d. Sami Al-Hussayen
- e. Saleh Al-Hussayen
- f. Ghassan Al-Sharbi
- g. Osama Nooh
- h. Lafi Al-Harbi
- i. Omar Al-Bayoumi
- j. Osama Bassnan
- k. Mohdhar Abdullah
- l. Mohammed Al-Qudhaeein
- m. Hamdan Al-Shalawi
- n. Omar Saleh Badahdah
- o. Munir Al-Motassadeq
- p. Mohammed Fakihi
- q. Ali and Maha Hafeez Al-Marri
- r. Said Bakala

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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

- s. Fahad Alotaibi
- t. Hamad Alotaibi
- u. Homaidan Al-Turki;
- 2. German BKA personnel involved in Motassadeq investigation and trial
- 3. Author of CIA paper on [REDACTED]
- 4. Current NSC and Treasury Officials involved in the September 11<sup>th</sup> investigation.

**B. Aggressiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Investigate Possible Ties Between the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family, and the September 11th attacks.**

- 1. Pasquale J. D'Amuro, FBI Executive Assistant Director;
- 2. Larry Medford, FBI Counterterrorism executive;
- 3. CTC executives, including [REDACTED]
- 4. CIA-Treasury-NSC financial tracking task force personnel;
- 5. CIA Directorate of Intelligence analysts and managers;
- 6. Current and former White House/NSC officials;
- 7. Personnel on joint CIA-FBI Saudi Task Force;
- 8. FBI Washington Field Office personnel;
- 9. CIA-NR [REDACTED]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

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**Item 4: Document Requests**

1. Joint Inquiry Report of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees;
2. CIA analytic product entitled  E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
3. All FBI and CIA documents since 1994 on possible Saudi Government involvement in terrorist activity;
4. All internal memos to FBI executives on Saudi Government cooperation in the September 11<sup>th</sup> investigations;
5. All FBI non-administrative documents, including Letterhead Memoranda, since November 1, 2002, from the following investigations:
  - a. Salah Bedaiwi
  - b. Fahad Al-Thumairy
  - c. Abdullah Bin Ladin
  - d. Sami Al-Hussayen
  - e. Saleh Al-Hussayen
  - f. Ghassan Al-Sharbi Osama Nooh
  - g. Lafi Al-Harbi
  - h. Omar Al-Bayoumi
  - i. Osama Bassnan
  - j. Mohdhar Abdullah
  - k. Mohammed Al-Qudhaeein
  - l. Hamdan Al-Shalawi
  - m. Omar Saleh Badahdah
  - n. Munir Al-Motassadeq
  - o. Mohammed Fakihi
  - p. Ali and Maha Hafeez Al-Marri

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- q. Said Bakala, Fahad Alotaibi
  - r. Hamad Alotaibi
  - s. Homaidan Al-Turki;
6. Intelligence Community debriefings of:
    - a. Mohammed Maan Al-Qhatani
    - b. Ghassan al-Sharbi
    - c. Mohammed Haydar Zammar
    - d. Ramzi Binalshib
    - e. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed;
  7. NSC strategy documents on investigating and countering Saudi-sponsored terrorism;
  8. Transcripts from Mounir Mottasadeq trial;
  9. Meeting agendas, notes, and other summaries from weekly CIA-Treasury-FBI financial task force meetings discussing possible Saudi government involvement in terrorist financing, September 11th-present;
  10. Any communications from the National Security Council to the FBI or the Department of Justice containing policy and guidance on investigating possible Saudi sponsored terrorism, 1994-present;
  11. Any communications from the State Department to the FBI containing policy or guidance on investigating possible Saudi sponsored terrorist, 1994-present;
  12. All internal documents produced by the post-September 11 CIA-FBI Saudi working group summarizing their efforts and findings;
  13. Documents in the possession of the FBI obtained through the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> investigation of  E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
  14. Summaries from meetings of FBI, CIA, NSC; or State Department personnel with Saudi Government officials on counterterrorism matters, 1994-present;
  15. FBI and CIA investigative summaries from the OPM/SANG, Khobar Towers, and U.S.S. *Cole* investigations;

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16. Any documents from the Saudi Government to the NSC, State Department, FBI or CIA outlining Saudi efforts to combat terrorist activity, 1994-present;
17. Any memoranda from ALEC Station to the DCI, on Saudi-sponsored terrorism, 1994-present.

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**Item 5: Briefings for Commissioners**

1. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff;
2. William Wechsler, former NSC official;
3. Lee Wolosky, former NSC official;
4. Matt Levitt, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; consultant, Team 1;
5. Joseph Kechichian, Kechichian & Associates (formerly with the Rand Corporation);
6. Dore Gold, former Israeli Ambassador to UN.

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**Possible Saudi Government and Royal Family Connections to the September 11 Hijackers and Other Terrorists and Terrorist Groups**

**Item 1: Key Questions**

**A. Possible Saudi Government and/or Royal Family Involvement in the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks**

1. Did any individuals, companies, religious institutions, or charitable organizations connected to the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family provide logistical, operational, financial, or theological support for the September 11, 2001, attacks?
2. Were any individuals connected to the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family aware of the September 11<sup>th</sup> plot prior to the attacks?

**B. Aggressiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Investigate Possible Ties Between the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family, and the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks**

1. How aggressively has the U.S. Government investigated possible ties between the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family, and the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks?
2. To what extent have the U.S. Government's efforts to investigate possible ties between the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family, and the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks been affected by political, economic, or other considerations?

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**Item 2: Suggested Readings**

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2. Transcript of the October 9-10, 2002, closed Joint Inquiry Hearing.
3. Robert Baer, "The Fall of the House of Saud," Atlantic Monthly, May 2003 (attached).
4. F. Gregory Gause, III "Saudi Perceptions of the United States since 9-11," prepared for the conference on "Western and Non-Western Perceptions of America in the Aftermath of 9-11," September 30-October 1, 2002 (draft) (attached).
5. Michael Isikoff, "9-11 Hijackers: A Saudi Money Trail?" Newsweek, November 22, 2002 (attached).
6. David Johnston and James Risen, "Threats and Responses: Tracking Terrorism: 9-11 report Says Saudi Arabia Links Went Unexamined," New York Times, November 23, 2002 (attached).
7. Lisa Myers, "Saudi Envoy, Sept. 11 figures linked," MSNBC, May 14, 2003 (attached).
8. Eric Rouleau, "Trouble in the Kingdom," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002 (attached).

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**Item 3: Interview Candidates**

**A. Possible Saudi Government and/or Royal Family Involvement in the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks**

1. Primary FBI, CIA and NSC personnel involved in investigations of the following individuals:

Individuals of interest:

- a. Daoud Chehaze
- b. Salah Bedaiwi
- c. Fahad Al-Thumairy
- d. Abdullah Bin Ladin
- e. Sami Al-Hussayen
- f. Saleh Al-Hussayen
- g. Ghassan Al-Sharbi
- h. Osama Nooh
- i. Lafi Al-Harbi
- j. Omar Al-Bayoumi
- k. Osama Bassnan
- l. Mohdhar Abdullah
- m. Mohammed Al-Qudhaecin
- n. Hamdan Al-Shalawi
- o. Omar Saleh Badahdah
- p. Munir Al-Motassadeq
- q. Mohammed Fakihi
- r. Ali and Maha Hafeez Al-Marri

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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

- s. Said Bakala
- t. Fahad Alotaibi
- u. Hamad Alotaibi
- v. Homaidan Al-Turki;
- 2. German BKA personnel involved in Motassadeq investigation and trial
- 3. Author of CIA paper on [REDACTED]
- 4. Current NSC and Treasury Officials involved in the September 11<sup>th</sup> investigation.

**B. Aggressiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Investigate Possible Ties Between the Saudi Government and/or Royal Family, and the September 11 attacks.**

- 1. Pasquale J. D'Amuro, FBI Executive Assistant Director
- 2. Larry Medford, FBI Counterterrorism executive
- 3. CTC executives, including [REDACTED]
- 4. CIA-Treasury-NSC financial tracking task force personnel
- 5. CIA DI analysts and managers
- 6. Current and former White House/NSC officials
- 7. Personnel on joint CIA-FBI Saudi Task Force
- 8. FBI Washington Field Office personnel
- 9. CIA-NR [REDACTED]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

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1. Joint Inquiry Report of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees;
2. CIA analytic product entitled  E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
3. All FBI and CIA documents since 1994 on possible Saudi Government involvement in terrorist activity;
4. All internal memos to FBI executives on Saudi Government cooperation in the OPM/SANG, Khobar Towers, and September 11<sup>th</sup> investigations;
5. All FBI non-administrative documents, including Letterhead Memoranda, since November 1, 2002 from the following investigations:
  - a. Daoud Chehaze
  - b. Salah Bedaiwi
  - c. Fahad Al-Thumairy
  - d. Abdullah Bin Ladin
  - e. Sami Al-Hussayen
  - f. Saleh Al-Hussayen
  - g. Ghassan Al-Sharbi Osama Nooh
  - h. Lafi Al-Harbi
  - i. Omar Al-Bayoumi
  - j. Osama Bassnan
  - k. Mohdhar Abdullah
  - l. Mohammed Al-Qudhaeein
  - m. Hamdan Al-Shalawi
  - n. Omar Saleh Badahdah
  - o. Munir Al-Motassadeq
  - p. Mohammed Fakihi

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- q. Ali and Maha Hafeez Al-Marri
  - r. Said Bakala, Fahad Alotaibi
  - s. Hamad Alotaibi
  - t. Homaidan Al-Turki;
6. Intelligence Community debriefings of:
    - a. Mohammed Maan Al-Qhatani
    - b. Ghassan al-Sharbi
    - c. Mohammed Haydar Zammar
    - d. Ramzi Binalshib
    - e. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed;
  7. NSC strategy documents on investigating and countering Saudi-sponsored terrorism;
  8. Transcripts from Mounir Mottasadeq trial;
  9. Meeting agendas, notes, and other summaries from weekly CIA-Treasury-FBI financial task force meetings discussing possible Saudi government involvement in terrorist financing, September 11th-present;
  10. Any communications from the National Security Council to the FBI or the Department of Justice containing policy and guidance on investigating possible Saudi sponsored terrorism, 1994-present;
  11. Any communications from the State Department to the FBI containing policy or guidance on investigating possible Saudi sponsored terrorist, 1994-present;
  12. All internal documents produced by the post-September 11 CIA-FBI Saudi working group summarizing their efforts and findings;
  13. Documents in the possession of the FBI obtained through the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> investigation of  E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)
  14. Summaries from meetings of FBI, CIA, NSC, or State Department personnel with Saudi Government officials on counterterrorism matters, 1994-present;

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15. FBI and CIA investigative summaries from the OPM/SANG, Khobar Towers, and U.S.S. *Cole* investigations;
16. Any documents from the Saudi Government to the NSC, State Department, FBI or CIA outlining Saudi efforts to combat terrorist activity, 1994-present;
17. Any memoranda from ALEC Station to the DCI, on Saudi-sponsored terrorism, 1994-present.

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**Item 5: *Briefings for Commissioners***

1. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff;
2. William Wechsler, former NSC official;
3. Lee Wolosky, former NSC official;
4. Matt Levitt, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; consultant, Team 1;
5. Joseph Kechichian, Kechichian & Associates (formerly with the Rand Corporation);
6. Dore Gold, former Israeli Ambassador to UN.

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**The FBI Informant with Whom 9/11 Hijackers  
Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar Resided**

**Item 1: Key Questions**

**A. Informant's Credibility**

1. Did the FBI informant who lived with hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in San Diego accurately portray to the FBI his relationship with the hijackers? What accounts for any inaccuracies in his statements to the FBI?
2. Was the FBI informant aware of the hijackers' terrorist affiliations, plans, and intentions prior to the September 11 attacks?
3. Has the FBI completed its investigation of issues relating to the informant's credibility? If so, what were the results of this investigation and was it sufficiently thorough and impartial?

**B. Congressional Oversight of the FBI**

**[Philip: We are not sure if these are worded too strongly. What do you think?]**

1. Did the FBI intentionally withhold from the Joint Inquiry information about the informant's relationship with the hijackers and subsequently attempt to obstruct the Joint Inquiry's investigation of the matter?
2. If the FBI did withhold information and obstruct the Joint Inquiry's investigation, were the FBI's actions indicative of a larger pattern of FBI non-compliance with Congressional oversight? What changes would therefore be needed to ensure more effective Congressional oversight of the FBI?
3. Why did the FBI, Department of Justice, and White House refuse to allow the Joint Inquiry to interview or depose the informant?

**C. The FBI's Informant Program**

1. Prior to September 11, did the FBI adequately exploit the informant's access and reporting, and validate the information the informant provided to the extent allowable and/or required under FBI and Department of Justice regulations? If not, were the FBI's failures indicative of systemic problems within the FBI's informant program?
2. Did the FBI and Department of Justice guidelines regarding the handling of informants inhibit the FBI's ability to adequately exploit the informant's access and reporting prior to September 11? If so, what changes are necessary to ensure the success of the informant program?

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**D. Issues for the Commission to Consider in Pursuing the Informant Issue**

1. Would the Commission be able to resolve issues relating to the informant's credibility through interviews and/or deposition of the informant?
2. Should the Commission pursue the issue of interviewing or deposing the informant in the face of likely FBI, Department of Justice, and White House opposition?
3. Should the Commission seek approval to provide the informant with transactional or use immunity in exchange for the informant's testimony?

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**Item 2: Suggested Readings**

1. Transcript of October 9-10, 2002, Closed Joint Inquiry Hearing;
2. Final Report of the Joint Inquiry, pp. 165-176;
3. Michael Isikoff, "The Informant Who Lived with the Hijackers," Newsweek, September 16, 2002 (attached);
4. James Risen, "Threats and Responses: The Inquiry; Congress Seeks FBI Data on Informer; FBI Resists," October 5, 2002 (attached);
5. Susan Schmidt, "9/11 Panel Discusses Informant," Washington Post, October 11, 2002 (attached);
6. CBS Morning News: "Confrontation between Congress and the FBI Over Key Information about 9/11" (transcript), October 11, 2002 (attached).

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